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Introduction 
The objective of  this paper is to assess, in a reasonably realistic manner, 
the  quantitative  importance  of  various  patterns  of  intergenerational 
wealth transmission on the overall level of  wealth inequality. The basic 
ingredients of  the analysis are: a set of  models of  the main processes in- 
volved in the evolution of  the size distribution of  wealth; detailed micro- 
data drawn from two Statistics  Canada surveys for the distribution  of 
wealth  and  the pattern  of  saving; and  a  specially developed computer 
simulation program. 
The analysis  starts  with  the  distribution  of  wealth  as  observed  in 
Canada in May,  1970, and projects it to the year 2000 under  a range 
of  alternative  assumptions. 
The model developed for the analysis involves a new methodological 
approach.  For example,  it is  not  based  on the  Orcutt,  et al.  (1976) 
style of  microsimulation which  operates at the level of  individuals and 
families. Instead, the population density function representing the wealth 
distribution for each age/family  size group is  the basic building block 
or object of  analysis. As a result, the model consists of  a set of  compon- 
ent processes that are defined, in mathematical terms, directly as opera- 
tions on distributions. In this way, restrictive assumptions such as omis- 
sion  of  age  specific  distributional  detail  (e.g.,  Atkinson  1971)  and 
reliance  on specific inequality  measures  or fixed  function  forms  (e.g., 
Oulton  1976; Blinder  1973)  can  be  avoided.  At the  same  time,  the 
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simulation model is considerably smaller and less costly to run than that 
developed by  Orcutt, et al.  (1976). The model constitutes  a develop- 
ment of  the “continuum” approach to models of  size distributions rather 
than the “fixed identity” approach as described by Vaughan (1975) and 
Wolfson (1  977). 
The plan of  the paper is as follows:  First, the general structure of  the 
model will be described. Then the component processes  specifically as- 
sociated in the intergenerational transmission of  wealth will be developed. 
Finally, the  results  of  a  set  of  computer  simulations  focusing  on the 
bequest process  will be presented  and discussed.  The interested reader 
is referred to Wolfson  (1977) for a detailed discussion  of  the model, 
data, and other simulation results. 
5.1  General Structure of  the Model 
The time series model of  the evolution of  the distribution  of  wealth 
starts  with  an  “observation”  of  this  distribution.  This  observation  is 
drawn from the  1970 Statistics  Canada Survey of  Consumer Finance. 
The population was divided into two family size groups-ane-adult  fam- 
ilies  (including  single  parent  families)  and  two-or-more  adult  fam- 
ilies (all of  which are assumed to be exactly two-adult nuclear families) 
-and  twelve five-year age groups,  the youngest  being  20-24  and the 
eldest 85-89.  For each of  these twenty-four  age/family  size groups,  a 
wealth density function was tabulated using thirty given wealth intervals. 
The twenty-four wealth densities then constituted  the starting point for 
the model. 
The time series model projects  this disaggregated  wealth  distribution 
five years at a time. Figure 5.1 displays the general structure of the model 
where  Wat  represents  the wealth  densities for age  group a  (ISalA) 
at time  t. (A subscript for family size has been  omitted for notational 
convenience.) It should be noted that the ordering of  these processes is 
somewhat arbitrary; for example, marriage could precede  divorce. It is 
assumed that reordering would not affect our results significantly. 
The first step in the evolution of  the set of  wealth densities is the sav- 
ing process. This process is quite complex. Actual saving rates and dis- 
tributions  of  saving  by  age,  family  size,  and  wealth  category  were 
obtained by special analysis  and  tabulation  of  the microdata  from  the 
1970 Statistics Canada Survey of  Family Expenditures. These observed 
saving patterns as well as assumed rates of  return are combined with the 
wealth densities in a complex of  operations that include scaling and con- 
volution. 
In the growth step, the two main concerns are to keep the wealth den- 
sities  in  constant dollars and  to  account  for population  growth.  It is 
assumed that population  is  growing at 10 percent, nominal saving at 25 189  The Bequest Process and the Causes of  Inequality 
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Fig. 5.1  General  Structure  of  the  Time  Series  Model.  Variables: 
W,, = distribution of  wealth; Eat =  distribution of  estates; 
I,, = distribution of  inheritance. 
percent,  and prices  at  12.5 percent,  all per five  years.  The pattern  of 
saving (i.e.,  the “shapes” of  the saving density functions by age, family 
size, and wealth category)  is assumed  fixed  as observed  in  1970. The 
growth process therefore involves a set of  vertical and horizontal scaling 
operations on the wealth and saving densities. 
The mortality step is based on observed age and sex specific mortality 
rates. Note that when only one spouse in a two-adult  family dies, it be- 
comes a one-adult family; if both spouses die it becomes an estate.  (The 
annual mortality  rates  have  been  appropriately  transformed  into  five- 
year rates.) The mortality rate for the 85-89  age group is assumed to be 
100 percent.  Mortality  has  also  been  assumed  to be  independent  of 190  Michael C. Wolfson 
wealth and marital status (admittedly an incorrect assumption, e.g., see 
Shorrocks 1975). The wealth densities of survivors and estates are then 
obtained by a combination of  scaling and vertical addition operations. 
The aging process involves simply bumping each age group’s wealth. 
density down to the next slot in the full age-wealth joint density. 
Divorce and marriage are based on observed rates and the assumption 
that for divorce the wealth is  divided equally between  the two parting 
spouses. In the case of  marriage, two polar assumptions have been con- 
sidered:  random  mating  and perfectly  assortative  mating  (rich  marry 
rich, poor marry poor, and so on).  The latter assumption will be used in 
the simulations presented below.  Its importance is  examined briefly at 
the end of  the paper. 
Finally, the birth step involves giving an initial wealth distribution to 
subsequent “newborn” cohorts. It is assumed that the wealth distribution 
observed  in  1970 for  those  under 25  consisted  entirely  of  “prenatal” 
saving and can therefore be used for Wlt  in subsequent years. 
The final step in  the process  of  generating the set  of  Wn,t+l  (1 5 a 
5 A)  from the set of  Wat  is  to augment the wealth densities  using the 
distributions of  inheritances. The details of  the process are developed in 
the next section. It should be noted that the model assumes no gifts inter 
vivos. They could be incorporated into the model, but it  has been  as- 
sumed that as a first step, the analysis would be more transparent if all 
intergenerational transfers arose as the result of  bequests. 
5.2  The Bequest Process 
The basic determinant of  the bequest process in practice  is  the  way 
in  which  people  draw up their  wills. In a  will,  the  decedent  specifies 
(among other things) who the beneficiaries of  the estate are to be, and 
how much each will receive. Our intent here is to describe this process 
in such a way that it is easy to pose hypothetical questions of  the follow- 
ing form: What would the distribution of  wealth be like if  will  writing 
behavior differed from the usual pattern with regard to some aspect such 
as x? 
There are two basic difficulties that must be overcome, however. The 
first is a general lack of  data (see,  e.g.,  Shoup  1966; Jantscher  1967; 
Cheng, Grant, Ploeger, no date). For example, it is not well known how 
the average number of  heirs varies with the size of  the estate. In cases 
like this, our strategy will be to define a set of  polar cases. These cases 
are ones that would be expected, intuitively, to constitute bounds on the 
kinds of behavior most likely to be observed. 
This procedure of  constructing bounding assumptions is like that used 
for the pattern of  marriage above where, in the absence of  reasonable 191  The Bequest Process and the Causes of  Inequality 
data, we identified assortative and random mating as a priori bounding 
polar cases. 
A second difficulty is that where polar assumptions regarding bequests 
have  already  been  discussed  in the theoretical  literature,  they are not 
stated in a form suitable for our methodological  approach.  This prob- 
lem stems from the distinction between  the “fixed identity”  and “con- 
tinuum” approaches. For example, we just referred to the division of  an 
estate among the heirs. The conventional polar assumptions are primo- 
geniture and equal division. But these cases are typically defined for an 
average or representative estate-the  fixed identity approach. Our prob- 
lem will be to define corresponding polar cases directly in terms of dis- 
tributions of  estates-the  continuum approach. 
The starting point for the bequest process in the context of  figure 5.1 
is the set of  estate distributions  {Ent(x)},  where a indicates the age of 
the decedents. The end point  of  the process is  the set of  wealth  distri- 
butions  { Wa,t+  (x)  }  that  have  been  augmented  by  inheritance.  The 
basic assumption to begin with is that between these two endpoints, the 
bequest process can be divided into three  broad  steps which  are inde- 
pendent of  each other. These steps will then form the framework within 
which the polar assumptions will be constructed. These three steps are: 
the transformation of  estates into bequests  (how each estate is divided) ; 
the  transformation  of  bequests  into inheritances  (how the  ages  of de- 
cedents and inheritors  are related) ;  and the association  of  inheritances 
and inheritors (how within age groups the size of  the inheritance tends 
to be related to the wealth level of  the inheritor). 
Clearly, any detailed description of  how these steps operate in reality 
is necessarily  very complex. The requirement for our model then  is  to 
construct a concise and relatively simple set of  assumptions. These  as- 
sumptions should be formulated in  accordance  with  three main objec- 
tives:  they should span the full range of  behavior likely to be observed 
within each step; they should be easily translated  into simple  and  effi- 
cient computer algorithms; and they should be parameterized  in such a 
way that a relatively small number of  “points” span or fully explore all 
possible combinations of  polar cases. 
We turn now to a discussion of  each of  the three main steps of the 
bequest process  and the particular  assumptions that will  be employed. 
5.2.1  Estates to Bequests 
Recall that it has already been  assumed that if  only one spouse in a 
family dies, all wealth passes to the surviving spouse. Thus estates arise 
only when individuals, or both spouses in  a family, die. There are two 
basic assumptions that will be made to start. First, we will make no dis- 
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coming from  “deceased” families. Thus, a preliminary  step of  the  be- 
quest process is actually to combine the estates (i.e., vertically  add the 
two distributions)  for the two family size groups within each age inter- 
val. The second assumption concerns legal practice  by which it is  im- 
possible to inherit  debt. The “estates”  of  individuals  or families dying 
in debt are therefore ignored.  However, the plight  of  these  (negative) 
estates’ creditors is also ignored (less than 0.04 percent of  aggregate net 
worth in 1970-74). 
The polar possibilities with regard to disequalizing or equalizing ten- 
dencies, in the case of  a single estate  (the fixed identity approach), are 
that it is either left intact and passed to a single heir  (age and sex are 
ignored), or  divided  equally  among  some larger  number  of  heirs,  h. 
These two cases will be called primogeniture and equal division, respec- 
tively. Perhaps a more realistic situation is what might be called “modi- 
fied primogeniture.”  In this case, some proportion  p  of  the estate goes 
to one heir while the remaining part (1-p)is divided equally among the 
remaining h-1  heirs.  Note that p =  l/h corresponds  to equal division, 
and p = 1 to primogeniture. It would also seem realistic to expect some 
relationship between the size of  the estate and the way it is divided. For 
example, if  only the very wealthy were concerned  about keeping  their 
estates intact, one might expect more primogeniture at the upper end of 
the wealth spectrum than at the lower end. (A more formal way to de- 
scribe this last  example is  “differential  division,”  the  assumption  that 
the size range of  estates is partitioned into a set of  wealth intervals, and 
within each interval a different pattern of  division occurs: primogeniture 
in one, equal division among h heirs in another.) 
The discussion so far has  been  in  terms  of  single or representative 
estates. But our concern  is  to formulate  these  assumptions  directly  in 
terms of  distributions. To this end, let B,,(x) be the density function of 
bequests  coming from  the  estates  of  decedents  age  a. We  then  seek 
ways of  relating B,(x)  to E,(x).  (The time subscript has been dropped 
for notational convenience only.) 
Let us consider five such relationships, based on the discussion above 
of  the possibilities with regard  to a single estate: 
a.  Primogeniture: B,(x)  =  E,,(x) 
b.  Equal Division:  B,(x)  =  h2E,(hx) 
c.  Modified  Primogeniture,  i.e., a bequest  of  size x may have come 
either  from an  estate of  size  x/p,  or from  an estate  of  size  (h  -1) 
x/(1  -P):  B,,(x)  =E,(x/p) + (h- 1)2E,r(h-  1) x/(l  -PI1 
d. Class Primogeniture, i.e., below some wealth level w there is  equal 
division while above it there  is primogeniture: 193  The Bequest Process and the Causes of Inequality 
Then B,(x)  =  h2E;  (hx) +  E;72 (x) 
e.  Differential  Division,  i.e.,  the  wealth  spectrum  is  divided  into  k 
intervals; within  each interval  there  is  equal  division  among  h,  heirs; 
h, =  1 implies primogeniture in the ith interval: 
Edx)  fort,< x I  c,+1 
Let ‘A  (‘1  =  0  otherwise  I 
I 
Then B,(x) = 8 h;  E; (h,w)  ,=  1 
From these descriptions it is clear that a and b are special cases of c, 
indeed polar cases of  c with regard to their equalizing or disequalizing 
tendencies. Also, a, b, and d are special cases of  e. Because of  its rela- 
tive flexibility e, differential division, has been chosen as the general para- 
metric form for the model of  this part of  the bequest process. The pa- 
rameters are then: 
k =  the number of distinct wealth classes from the point of 
view  of  bequest behavior  (this number  has nothing to 
do with  the wealth  classes used  by  the cross-sectional 
saving function) ; 
c, =  the lower limit  (in dollars) of  the ith wealth  class  (as- 
sumed fixed in real terms) ; and 
h, 1  the number of  heirs in the ith wealth class. 
In the simulation runs described below, only two wealth classes (k  = 
2) will  be used  with  a  wealth  cutoff  of  cp 1  $40,000 in  1970 and h, 
taking values  in the set  { 1 , 2, 4, 6). Specific assumptions for this step 
will  be  denoted  “heirs =  h,, hp.” Since  the  number  of  heirs  in  each 
wealth class is  the parameter of greatest  interest, cp  is  not  included  in 
this shorthand notation. Given this value of  cp, i =  1 can be interpreted 
as a reference to poor or middle class families, and when  i =  2 the ref- 
erence is to the rich. 
The situation  with  heirs =  2,1 (hl =  2 and h2 =  1) is  illustrated  in 
figures 5.2 and 5.3, in terms of  the population  density function and LO- 
renz  curve,  respectively.  It seems  clear  from  the  comparison  between 
figures 5.3a and 5.3b that the  distribution of  bequests  is  more unequal 
after this differential division than after “universal primogeniture” where 
hl =  h2 = 1. However this  conclusion  is  complicated by the fact  that 194  Michael C. Wolfson 
the number of  bequests is different in the two cases. If  nl is the number 
of  “poor” estates and n2 is the number of  rich estates, then differential 
division in this particular case results in nl more more bequests than uni- 
versal primogeniture. As an alternative, if  the Lorenz curves for bequests 
for heirs =  2,1 and heirs = 1,l with a suitable number  (nl  in this case) 
of zero inheritances included  are compared, then it is clear that differ- 
ential division (heirs =  2,l) results in a more equal distribution of  be- 
quests (“higher” Lorenz curve) than universal primogeniture. This point 
is  illustrated in figure 5.3~. 
- 
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In fact, a more general proposition  is possible. If  the two alternative 
assumptions heirs =  g,,g,  and heirs =  hl,hz are being compared, where 
g1 5 hl and g2  5 hS and strict inequality holds at least once, then heirs 
=  hl,h2  will result in a more equal distribution of  bequests provided that 
the distribution  of  bequests  from heirs  =  gl,g2  is  “padded  out”  with 
enough zero bequests so  that the total number of  bequests is the same 
for the two distributions. (This proposition is proved in Wolfson 1977.) 
However, it is not possible  to say in  general which distribution  of  be- 
quests  is  more equal,  for  example,  when  comparing  heirs =  1,4 and 
heirs =  4,l. 
5.2.2  Bequests to Inheritances 
In our model, the basic distinction between bequests and inheritances 
lies in the significance of  the age subscript. The “age” of  a bequest refers 
to the age of  the decedent, while the “age” of  an inheritance refers to the 
age of the inheritor. The problem in this step of  the bequest process is to 
define a general parametric relationship between the two sets of  distribu- 
tions. One major issue here concerns “generation skipping.”  It appears 
that many of  the wealthy, to reduce total tax liability over several genera- 
tions, leave substantial portions of  their estates (in the form of  trusts) to 
their grandchildren (Shoup 1966, p. 41). Lampman (1962, p. 239) sug- 
gests that this behavior has an equalizing effect. It also appears that many 
estates are divided among heirs of  two or three different generations. 
Given this range of  bequest behavior, it seems important to be able to 
examine the effects of  age differences between decedents and inheritors. 
This will be done in a highly simplified way:  all the heirs of  decedents 
aged a will be assumed to be the same age, and this age will be d years 
less than the age of  the decedent. And if  decedents are age a 5 d (i.e., 
their heirs would be in age group a -  d < 20), then their heirs will be 
assumed to be in the first age group  (20-24).  Thus, the possibility that 
heirs of  the same estate, or generally of  decedents of  the same age, may 
be of  different ages has been ignored. And by implication, the possibility 
that heirs of  certain ages may be more likely to inherit larger portions of 
the estate than heirs of  other ages  (e.g., children versus  siblings of  the 
decedent) will also be ignored, since all the heirs of  any given estate will 
be in the same age group. But as a starting point, this assumption still 
allows an interesting range of  “polar” cases to be examined, defined in 
terms of  the single parameter d. More formally, the assumption will be: 
d+ 1 
,I-  1 
Zl(X) = s  Ba(x) 
Z,(X)  =  B,+&(x)  for 2 5 a 5 A -  d, 
Za(X) =  0  forA -  d <  a 5 A, 197 
where Z,(x)  is the density function of  inheritances destined for inheritors 
aged  a  and  0 5 d < A. In general,  this  assumption  will  be  denoted 
“age-diff =  d.” The values that will be examined are 0, 25, 45,  and 65. 
This assumption is  illustrated  in figure 5.4.  Note that if  one set of  dis- 
tributions of  bequests by age group is more equal than another  (in the 
general  sense  of  their all having  higher  Lorenz  curves)  then  the  cor- 
responding set of  distributions of  inheritances by age group will also be 
more equal (see Wolfson 1977). 
5.2.3  Inheritances  to Inheritors 
There are actually three parts to this step in the bequest process:  al- 
locating inheritances between the two family size  categories; choosing 
the subset of  each age/family  size category  who will  inherit; and asso- 
ciating inheritances by  size with  the wealth levels of  inheritors.  Given 
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the general objectives of  comprehensiveness and simplicity,  the follow- 
ing assumptions will be made: 
a.  Inheritances  are divided  between  the  two  family  size  groups  in 
proportion  to the  number of  family units  in  each.  Thus,  if  pnu  is  the 
number of  unattached individuals aged a and paf is the number of fam- 
ilies  aged a, then  (paU/(paU  +  pof))  Z,(x)  is the distribution  of  inheri- 
tances destined for unattached individuals aged a. 
b.  Two main methods for choosing inheritors will be distinguished. In 
both it is assumed that no inheritor receives more than one inheritance.’ 
Let pn =  number of  family units aged a (ignoring family size for 
q, =  number of  inheritances destined  for inheritors aged a, 
notational convenience) ; 
assumed less than pa; 
J,(x) =  wealth distribution of  inheritors  aged a; 
W,(x) =  wealth distribution of  all family units aged a; and 
w,  =  wealth level above which there are qa family units aged 
a. 
These definitions imply the following relationships : 
Two polar assumptions regarding the choice of  inheritors can now be 
easily defined, one highly  egalitarian  in  its  implications  and  the  other 
implying disequalizing tendencies. Formally,  the  assumptions  require  a 
relationship between J,(x) and W,(x).  The two assumptions are: 
Random  (equalizing) -the  probability  of  inheriting  is  independent 
of  wealth level. Thus, 
J,(x) =  (4a/Pa) W,(x) 
Select-R  (disequalizing) -only  the richest within each age group be- 
come inheritors. Thus, 
W,(x>  for x  2 w, 
Ja(x) =  0  otherwise 
Figure 5.5 illustrates these two  alternatives. Note that there  is  a  third 
possibility that would actually have stronger equalizing tendencies than 
random  choice  of  inheritors-namely  if  the  poorest  qn were  always 
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sumption of  “perfectly perverse assortative mating”  (rich systematically 
marrying poor) and it will not be considered further. 
c.  The final part of  this step of  the bequest process is  the manner in 
which the distributions  of  inheritances  Z,(x)  and  inheritors  J,(x)  are 
combined  (ignoring family size for notational  convenience).  We  shall 
again define two polar cases: 
Random  (equalizing) -the  probability  of  inheriting  any  particular 
amount  of  wealth,  given  that  one inherits,  is  independent  of  current 
wealth. 
w 
Fig. 5.5  Hypothetical Example of  Polar Cases  for the Selection of 
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Assortative  (disequalizing) -the  richest inheritor receives the largest 
inheritance,  the second richest  inheritor  receives the second largest in- 
heritance, and so on. 
The random case corresponds to the mathematical operation of con- 
voluting Z,(x)  and J,(x), and it can therefore use the algorithm already 
developed for the saving process and random mating. However, the as- 
sortative case here does not correspond to the case of  assortative mating 
in the demographic  model.  There, it was  possible  to make  use of the 
fact that the  wealth  distributions  of  prospective  husbands  and  wives 
were identical.2 But the shapes of  the distributions of  inheritances  and 
inheritors will not be the same in general. Fortunately, there is a simple 
mathematical  operation  corresponding  to  this  process  of  assortative 
combination:  the cumulative density function  of  perfectly  assortatively 
combined inheritances and inheritors is the horizontal sum of  the cumu- 
lative density of  inheritances and the cumulative density of  inheritors. 
Given a total  of  one assumption  in  part  (a), and  two  assumptions 
each in parts  (b) and  (c), there are a total of  four possible combina- 
ations of  assumptions in this third step of  the bequest process. However, 
to reduce the combinatorial problems of  having many possible  assump- 
tions, we shall focus on two  (compound) polar  assumptions regarding 
the receipt of inheritances by inheritors: 
Equal-The  most  equalizing  case for  combining inheritors  and  in- 
heritances is first to choose inheritors randomly from the wealth  dis- 
tribution of  potential inheritors, and then to match  inheritances with 
inheritors in a random manner. 
Unequal-The  most  disequalizing  polar  case  for  combining inheri- 
tors and inheritances  is  first  to select only  the richest  potential  in- 
heritors,  and then to match  the largest inheritances with  the richest 
inheritors assortatively. 
For convenience, these two  assumptions for combining inheritors  with 
inheritances  will be denoted “comb =  equal” and “comb =  uneq,”  re- 
spectively. 
It is clear that for any particular distribution of  inheritances, comb = 
equal will result in a more equal “post inheritance” distribution of  wealth 
than comb =  uneq. But consider a second question. Suppose it is known 
that one distribution  of  inheritances is  more  equal  (in the sense  of  a 
higher Lorenz curve) than another. Will the corresponding  postinheri- 
tance distribution of  wealth  also be more equal? The answer is yes  for 
both comb =  equal and comb =  uneq  (see Wolfson  1977). 
We have now completed the description of  the model  of  the bequest 
process. There are three main  steps. First, estates are divided  into be- 
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wealth class is used. Second, bequests are transformed into inheritances 
by considering the differences in age between  decedents and inheritors. 
Third, and finally, inheritors are selected and their wealth is augmented 
by inheritances in either an equalizing or a disequalizing manner. 
Formally,  any particular assumption for the bequest  process  can be 
summarized in terms of  the following parameters: 
k =  number  of  wealth  classes  for bequest behavior  of  de- 
cedents; 
ci  =  lower limit  (in 1970 dollars)  of  ith wealth class; 
hi =  number of  heirs in ith wealth class; 
d =  age difference between decedents and inheritors; and 
=  polar methods for matching inheritances and inheritors  [ 2$a1,/ 
However, we shall always assume k =  2 and usually assume that c2 = 
$40,000 (in  1970). (More wealth  classes  could have been  simulated, 
but it was  not felt that any further interesting  results would  emerge.) 
The shorthand notation for the three assumptions will then be: 
heirs =  hl,h2,  for hi E  { 1,2,4,6); 
age-diff =  d, ford  E  (0,25,45,65}; and 
comb =  equal or comb =  uneq. 
5.3  Computer Simulation Results 
Before launching into a discussion of  the simulation results, it is first 
necessary to explain how these results will be summarized. Typically,  a 
single simulation of  the time  series model will cover a period of  thirty 
years.  It therefore  generates  a sequence  of  six  age/family  size/wealth 
joint densities, in addition to the initial joint density for 1970. Further- 
more,  an  anlysis  of  a  particular  parameter  may  involve  as  many  as 
five or six such simulated wealth  sequences at a  time.  There is,  as  a 
result, a nontrivial problem of  “data reduction”-selecting  the key indi- 
cators of  the results  of  any simulated sequence of  wealth  distributions. 
Our approach to the problem is the following. First, the primary con- 
cern will be with the aggregate wealth  distribution, i.e., the distribution 
for all age/family  size groups combined. Second, for any wealth  distri- 
bution the focus will be on six summary statistics: the mean level of  net 
worth, three summary measures of  inequality, and two inequality indi- 
cators.  The three  inequality  measures  are  the  well-known  Gini  coeffi- 
cient  and  squared  coefficient of  variation  (CV), and  a  specially  de- 202  Michael C. Wolfson 
signed measure we have  called  the exponential  measure  (EXP). The 
two inequality indicators are the wealth shares of  the top 1 percent and 
next 4 percent of  the population.3 Finally, the main interest will be in 
the wealth  distribution  at the end of  the  sequence, in  the  year  2000. 
This approach is clearly  a dramatic simplification. From a total of  168 
(2 family size  groups,  14  age  groups,  6  years)  wealth  densities,  six 
scalar magnitudes will be distilled. However, when it is necessary to the 
discussion of  various simulation results we shall refer  to the more dis- 
aggregated data. 
The model of  the bequest process has three basic parameters:  heirs, 
age-diff, and comb. For each of  these parameters, a range of  values was 
specified.  Both the number  of  parameters  and  the  number  of  values 
each would take was  kept small so that the total  number  of  combina- 
tions  did  not  grow  too  large.  The main  reason  for  concern  over  the 
number of  possible combinations is the expectation that there could well 
be significant interaction among the parameters.  This expectation affects 
the experimental strategy. If  there were no significant interactions among 
the main parameters, it would be possible  to proceed  by  first  defining 
a “base run”  of  the simulation model.  Then  variations  around  it, one 
parameter at a time, could be explored. But in the case of  the bequest 
process, this approach is unacceptable. We must be able to check wheth- 
er or not there is significant interaction. Having a relatively small set of 
parameter combinations makes this task easier. 
Given the three main parameters and their range of  values, it is pos- 
sible to display the set of  combinations as nodes on a three-dimensional 
grid-or  two two-dimensional  grids,  one each for comb = equal  and 
comb =  uneq. The two 2-D grids are displayed in figure 5.6 below. 
The nodes marked by heavy  dots indicate the combinations  of  param- 
eters  which  have  been  simulated.  For  example,  (heirs = 1,l; comb 
=  uneq; age-diff =  45) has been simulated, while  (heirs =  4,1; comb 
=  uneq; age-diff =  25)  has  not.  This diagram,  therefore,  displays  the 
program of  experiments with the bequest model. This set of  simulations 
will be analyzed in two stages. 
The first parameter  that will be examined is  “heirs,” with  the set of 
“experimental values” corresponding to the two horizontal rows of  dots 
for age-diff =  45 in figure 5.6. The results of  these simulations are dis- 
played in table 5.1, collected into three groups. 
A preliminary observation concerns the level of  inequality in the year 
2000 compared with  1970. Even with universal primogeniture  (heirs z 
1,l) and unequal  combination  (comb =  uneq) , when  age-diff =  45 
inequality  in the upper tail  of  the distribution  is  reduced  by  the year 
2000  (CV =  5.0  versus  CV =  5.8,  and  top  1% =  17.0 versus  top 
1  % =20.3,  comparing run  1 and the 1970 values), though  inequality 
increases in the lower and middle ranges of  the wealth spectrum  (EXP comb = equal 
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Table 5.1  Time Series Results, Bequests Part 1 
Inequality  Wealth Shares 
Age-  Mean 
Run  Heirs  Diff  Comb  Wealth  Gini  CV  Exp  Top 1%  Next4% 
1  1,l  45 
2  2,2  45 
3  4,4  45 
4  6,6  45 
5  4, la  45 
6  4,1  45 
1  1,1  45 
3  4,4  45 
7  1,4  45 
8  4,l  45 
9  1,1  45 
10  4,4  45 















18.2  .81  5.0  .70  17.0  25.1 
18.4  .79  4.0  .68  14.2  24.2 
18.5  .76  3.4  .66  12.6  22.6 
18.5  .74  3.1  .65  12.0  21.6 
18.1  .79  4.8  .68  17.1  23.4 
18.2  .78  4.6  .68  16.7  22.5 
18.2  .81  5.0  .70  17.0  25.1 
18.5  .76  3.4  .66  12.6  22.6 
18.4  .79  3.7  .68  13.1  24.6 
18.3  .72  3.2  .64  12.5  21.4 
18.4  .75  3.3  .65  12.4  21.8 
18.3  .68  2.6  .61  10.9  19.3 
18.5  .71  2.7  .63  10.9  19.8 
15.4  .75  5.8  .65  20.3  20.9 
Note:  aCutoff at $25,000; all others at $40,000. 
= .70 versus EXP =  .65, and Gini = .81 versus Gini  .75). Intui- 
tively, it appears that the dispersion in saving along with the other com- 
ponents of  the model is sufficient to generate increasing inequality  over 
time  in  the lower  and  middle  wealth  ranges.  But  with  these  bequest 
model parameters, the share of  the top 1 percent falls. (These inequality 
results do not hold when age-diff =  25, however, as will be seen in the 
next  set of  simulation results.)  It is  also  the  case that with  the  given 
growth rate  assumptions and no taxation,  average “real” wealth  grows 
slowly over the thirty-year  period.  (The geometric average growth  rate 
is 0.56% per year.) 
The first main observation is that as one would expect, increasing the 
number of  heirs reduces inequality quite substantially at all points in the 
wealth  spectrum.  This  result  holds  for both  equal  and  unequal  com- 
bination (runs 1 to 4  and runs 9 and 10). The only apparent interaction 
between  the comb and heirs parameters is  in  the upper tail of  the dis- 
tribution:  runs  1 and  3  do not  show  a  consistently  larger  or  smaller 
change in inequality values, either absolutely or  relatively, than do runs 
9 and 10 except for the CV and share of  the top 1 percent. This result 
(that more heirs implies less  inequality)  is  as expected,  since division 
among a larger number of  heirs implies that more family units have their 
wealth augmented by smaller amounts. 
The second main  observation  is  that  differential  division  (heirs = 
4, 1) does not  always lead  to unambiguously  (i.e., in  terms of  Lorenz 
curves)  lower inequality than universal  primogeniture. It appears to be 
the case for run  6 versus run  1. This result  is what one would  expect, 205  The Bequest Process and the Causes of Inequality 
given the earlier  theoretical  analysis.  But in  run  5 versus  run  1, the 
share of  the top  1 percent is higher.  The explanation  must be that de- 
spite the fact  that (initially, in  1970-74) the postinheritance  distribu- 
tions of wealth  are more equal in  run  5  than in run  1 (i.e.,  the upper 
tail of  the distribution is not so elongated), more family units are moved 
above the cutoff dividing middle and rich for the saving process. Thus, 
the disequalizing tendencies of  the saving and yield differences outweigh, 
in  this case, the effects of  a more equal postinheritance  distribution  of 
wealth. A similar result  (the share of  the top 1% increases)  occurs in 
run  8  versus run 9  with comb =  equal. 
If  we turn to the interactions between the heirs and comb parameters, 
we find that in  the case of  comb =  equal, all three summary measures 
agree on the ranking heirs =  1,l > heirs =  4,l > heirs =  1,4  > heirs 
=  4,4 (runs 8  to  11  ) . The same ranking holds when comb =  uneq for 
the CV; but the EXP is equal for heirs =  1,4  and heirs =  4,l (runs 6 
and 7)  ;  and the Gini reverses  their order. However, a more important 
interaction  between  the heirs  and comb parameters would  seem  to be 
revealed by the CV and share of  the top 1 percent. When comb =  uneq, 
having fewer heirs  (e.g.,  heirs =  1,l versus heirs =  4,4) has  a  much 
more pronounced effect in the upper tail of  the distribution  than when 
comb =  equal (runs  1 and 3 versus runs 9  and  10). These results cor- 
respond  to the intuition  that the disequalizing  effects of  primogeniture 
(relative to equal division) are highlighted and concentrated in the upper 
tail  of  the  distribution  when  comb =  uneq,  but  muted  and  spread 
throughout the distribution when comb =  equal. 
We turn now to focus on the effects of  age-diff, the age difference be- 
tween  decedents and inheritors. As figure 5.6 indicates,  there  are four 
sets of  runs that can be assembled to explore the age-diff parameter for 
alternative  heirs and comb assumptions, The results  of  these runs are 
set out in table 5.2 (runs 2, 6,  9,  and  12 have already appeared in  the 
previous table as runs  1, 3, 9,  and 10,  respectively). 
As a preliminary observation,  note that both  run  3  and run 4  have 
all indicators showing greater inequality than the 1970  values.  But the 
main observation to be drawn from these simulation results  is  that al- 
most  without  exception,  lower  values  of  age-diff  are  associated  with 
higher levels of  inequality.  (The only exception is the share of  the top 
I % in runs 12 and 13.) In other words, a general shift to more genera- 
tion skipping would decrease the level of  inequality over the next thirty 
years, in agreement with  Lampman’s  (1962,  p.  239) suggestion. 
A range of  factors must be combined  to explain this  phenomenon. 
The first fact to be kept in  mind is that almost 80 percent of  the (non- 
negative)  estates  in  the  model  are  from  decedents  aged  70-89. The 
average size of  these estates is about $16,000  in 1970-74.  Their average 
level of  inequality is relatively low  (Gini =  .56, CV =  1.8,  EXP =  .53, 206  Michael C.  Wolfson 
Table 5.2  Time Series Results, Bequests Part 2 
Inequality  Wealth Shares 
Age-  Mean 
Run  Heirs  Diff  Comb  Wealth  Gini  CV  Exp  Top 1%  Next4% 
1  1,1  65 
2  1,l  45 
3  1, 1  25 
4  1, 1  0 
5  4,4  65 
6  4,4  45 
7  4,4  25 
8  1, 1  65 
9  1,1  45 
10  1,1  25 
II  1,l  0 
12  4,4  65 
13  4,4  45 
















18.2  .76  3.5  .66  13.2  22.2 
18.2  .81  5.0  .70  17.0  25.1 
17.8  .83  6.0  .71  21.4  25.1 
17.5  .83  8.8  .71  24.7  21.8 
18.1  .68  2.7  .61  11.4  19.7 
18.5  .76  3.4  .66  12.6  22.6 
18.0  31  4.5  .70  15.6  24.8 
18.2  .73  3.2  .64  12.4  21.1 
18.4  .75  3.3  .65  12.4  21.8 
18.3  .77  3.5  .67  12.7  22.7 
17.5  .SO  4.2  .69  14.5  24.8 
18.1  .66  2.5  59  11.0  18.9 
18.3  .68  2.6  .61  10.9  19.3 
18.4  .72  2.8  .64  11.2  20.4 
15.4  .75  5.8  .65  20.3  20.9 
top  1% = 10, next 4% =  18) compared with both overall inequality 
and levels of  inequality within most age groups. When  age-diff  is  high, 
most of  these bequests are concentrated in the younger age groups rath- 
er than  being spread among more and  older  age  groups  (recall figure 
5.4). Since these young age groups tend to have below average wealth, 
the  main  effect  of  the  inheritances  is  to  raise  their  average  level  of 
wealth. By bringing it closer to the overall mean, the between-age-group 
component of  aggregate inequality is reduced. Had these bequests been 
spread among older age groups, more wealth  would have  gone  to age 
groups already owning closer to average or above average wealth.  Thus, 
lower values of  age-diff tend to distribute inheritances in such a way that 
“between group” inequality is reduced less or even increased. This point 
is illustrated by the figures given in table 5.3. 
A second point is that as  age-diff  decreases  (e.g.,  from  65 to 45), 
bequests are spread among a wider range of  age groups. In the case of 
unequal  combination  (of  inheritors  and  inheritances)  this  means,  for 
example, that an eightieth-percentile family unit in the 20-24  age group 
may no longer be an inheritor  while a ninety-seventh-percentile  family 
unit in the 35-39  age group (who is typically wealthier) may become an 
inheritor-clearly  a disequalizing ~hange.~  And as table 5.2 shows, with 
primogeniture  (heirs =  1,l) and  comb =  uneq,  the  decrease  in  age- 
diff  has a much more pronounced effect on the upper tail of  the distri- 
bution, indicated by the CV and share of  the top 1 percent, than in the 
other cases (runs 1 to 4 versus runs 5 to 14). 207  The Bequest Process and the Causes of Inequality 
Equal rather than unequal combination has the anticipated equalizing 
effect on the aggregate wealth distribution, for all combinations of  heirs 
and age-diff assumptions. Similarly, four-way  equal division rather than 
primogeniture continues to show equalizing effects for all combinations 
of  age-diff and comb assumptions. 
However,  the relative  impact  of  these  two pairs of  specific alterna- 
tives depends on age-diff. If  the “distance”  covered by each inequality 
measure  in  moving  from  unequal  combination  and  primogeniture  to 
equal combination and four-way division is examined, more of  this dis- 
tance is covered by the move to four-way division when age-diff =  65. 
But when age-diff is 45 or 25, more of  the distance is covered by mov- 
ing from unequal to equal combination.  This point is  illustrated in fig- 
ure 5.7. If  A,  B, C,  and D are the differences in the values of  a particu- 
lar inequality measure for the given pairs of  runs, it is clear that A +  D 
=  B +  C.  What the figure shows is that A > B  and thus D < C when 
age-diff =  65 for the Gini, CV, EXP, and share of  the top 1 percent and 
5 percent. But when age-diff =  45 or 25, B > A. 
Intuitively, the explanation  is  that the number of  heirs  has a greater 
impact on overall inequality than the manner of  combination when  all 
these heirs are concentrated in  the 20-24  age group. However, as the 
heirs are spread among a wider range of  age groups, the move to comb 
=  equal has a greater effect in reducing overall inequality than the move 
Table 5.3  Numbers and Sizes of  Estates Compared with 1970 Age-Wealth 
Distribution 
Family Size 1  Family Size 2+  Estates 
Age  Mean  Mean  Mean 
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heirs = 1,l 
comb = equal 
Fig. 5.7  Movement of Inequality Measures 
from heirs = 1,l to heirs =  4,4. Since the 20-24  age group has average 
wealth  substantially below  the overall  average, the  implication  is  that 
(obviously)  the main factor in accounting for the level of  inequality is 
the wealth position of  inheritors in  the overall distribution. An inheritor 
in the upper tail of  the distribution for the 20-24  age group  (comb = 
uneq, age-diff =  65)  may well own less wealth than the average family 
unit in the 60-64  age group (comb =  equal, age-diff =  25). 
As  a final point,  the average level of  wealth  in  the year 2000 is  in- 
fluenced  by  two main  factors: the extent  to which  inheritances  go  to 
age/wealth groups with higher accumulation rates (saving rate X yield) 
and the extent to which inheritances cause inheritors to move up to the 
next wealth class. For example, if  the effect of  a lower value of  age-diff 
is to redirect an inheritance from a middle class aged 20-24  family unit 
well below the wealth cutoff to an aged 30-34  family unit just below this 
cutoff,  average wealth  should increase  because  the inheritance will be 
subject to a higher accumulation rate with the latter family unit. 
As a matter of  further interest the pattern of  marriage will be consid- 
ered. Three pairs of  simulation runs will be examined, corresponding to 
three sets of  assumptions regarding the bequest process. The three sets 
of  assumptions are: A) there are no capital transfers at all  (i.e.,  100% 209  The Bequest Process and the Causes of Inequality 
estate tax) ;  B) there are no wealth taxes and all heirs are in the 20-24 
age group  (age-diff =  65); and C)  there are no wealth  taxes  and the 
age difference  between  decedents  and  inheritors  is  always  twenty-five 
years (age-diff =  25). 
In addition, except for the first pair of  runs, it is assumed that all es- 
tates have exactly one heir (heirs = 1,l) and that inheritors and inheri- 
tances  are  combined  in  a  “disequalizing”  manner  (comb =  uneq) . 
Otherwise, the simulation runs use identical inputs.  The results for the 
aggregate wealth distributions in the year 2000 are displayed in table 5.4. 
Table 5.4  Time Series Results, Pattern of  Marriage 
Inequality  Wealth Share 
Pattern of  Bequest  Mean 
Marriage  Assumption  Wealth  Gini  CV  EXP  Top 1%  Next 4% 
Assort.  A  14.3  .80  3.9  .70  13.8  22.5 
random  A  14.3  .79  3.8  .68  13.4  22.3 
Assort.  B  18.2  .76  3.5  .66  13.2  22.2 
random  B  18.1  .74  3.2  .65  12.5  21.6 
Assort.  C  17.8  .83  6.6  .71  21.4  25.1 
random  C  17.8  .82  6.4  .70  20.8  25.1 
The pattern of  marriage, unlike the pattern of  bequests, appears to be 
of small quantitative significance, in contrast to Blinder’s (1973, p. 624) 
conclusion. Its quantitative effect is strongest in the second pair of runs. 
Intuitively, this observation is quite plausible:  concentrating  all inheri- 
tance in the youngest age group gives the greatest chance, of  the three 
runs, for the pattern of  marriage to have an effect. The reason, of  course, 
is that the youngest age group has the most marrying yet to do. 
5.4  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, the general structure of  the time series model developed 
in  Wolfson  (1977)  has been  briefly described  and the basic structure 
of the bequest submodel has been specified. The task of  the bequest part 
of  the time series model is to transform  the distribution of  estates gen- 
erated by mortality into a set of  wealth distributions of  survivors where 
inheritors have been found and their wealth has been augmented by the 
amounts of  their inheritances. This process has been divided into three 
main  steps:  transforming  estates  into bequests,  transforming  bequests 
into  inheritances,  and  matching  inheritances  with  inheritors.  Corre- 
spondingly, three main parameters of  the bequest process have been de- 
fined: the heirs parameter describes the way in which estates are divided 
into bequests, using either primogeniture or equal division for either of 
two  wealth  classes; the  age-diff  parameter  gives  the  age  difference  in 
years between  decedents and their heirs, as an indication of  the extent 210  Michael C. Wolfson 
of generation skipping; and the comb parameter determines whether in- 
heritors  are to be selected and matched  (combined) with  their  inheri- 
tances in an equalizing or disequalizing manner. 
The basic conclusions are: 
a. Equal division among a large number of  heirs reduces inequality. 
This effect is most pronounced in the upper tail of  the distribution when 
there  is  unequal  combination.  When  there  is  equal  combination,  the 
strength of  this effect is relatively unaffected by the extent of  generation 
skipping  (age-diff) . When  there  is  unequal  combination,  the  effect is 
stronger in the upper tail of  the distribution  (CV and share of  the top 
1  % ) but weaker elsewhere  (Gini and EXP) when there is less genera- 
tion skipping (age-diff is lower). 
b.  Differential  division generally  results  in less inequality  than  uni- 
versal  primogeniture,  and more  inequality than  equal division.  Excep- 
tions  can  arise  because  of  differential  yields  and  saving  behavior  by 
wealth class. 
c. More extensive generation skipping reduces inequality. This effect 
is  strongest  when  there is  unequal  combination.  Given  unequal  com- 
bination, the strongest effect in the upper tail occurs with universal pri- 
mogeniture. Given equal combination, the strength of  this effect is rela- 
tively unaffected by the pattern of  division. 
d. Unequal rather than equal combination results in greater inequal- 
ity. For both primogeniture and equal division, this effect is much stron- 
ger when there is no generation skipping. For various amounts of  genera- 
tion skipping, this effect is not greatly affected by the pattern of  division 
(heirs =  1,l versus heirs =  4,4). 
e.  The levels of  inequality generated for the year 2000 fall on both 
sides of  the levels observed in 1970. 
f.  With no capital transfer taxes, real  average  wealth  increases from 
1970 to 2000 by about 0.6 percent per year, 
g.  The pattern of  marriage appears relatively unimportant. 
Notes 
1. Note that this assumption  implies a constraint  on the acceptable  values  of 
the parameters {hi}  and d defined above-so  that the number of  inheritances never 
exceeds the number of  potential inheritors. These parameter  values will  always be 
chosen so that this constraint is not binding. 
2.  In that case, the “assortatively married” distribution was simply the husbands’ 
(or wives’)  distribution  horizontally  scaled by  a  factor of  two  (and scaled ver- 
tically by one-half and again by one-half 1. 
3.  The Gini is  most sensitive to inequality near the mode; the CV  is  relatively 
more sensitive in the  upper  tail  of  the distribution;  while  the EXP  is  relatively 211  The Bequest Process and the Causes of Inequality 
more  sensitive  to  inequality  at  the  lower  end  of  the  wealth  spectrum.  An  in- 
equality  measure  always obeys the Pigou-Dalton  condition  of  transfer, while  an 
inequality  indicator  satisfies  only  the  weaker  condition  of  never  violating  the 
Pigou-Dalton  condition.  These  five statistics  have  been  chosen  to give the  most 
complete  picture  of  the aspects  of  the  “shape”  of  a  wealth  density  in  which  we 
are most interested.  For a more complete discussion, see Wolfson  (1977, chap. 3), 
and Love and Wolfson  (1976). 
4. More precisely, when  heirs = 1,1,  age-diff =  65 implies that 22.8 percent  of 
the  20-24  age  group  inherit.  But  age-diff =  45  implies  that  7.1  percent  of  the 
20-24  age group inherit and  11.9 percent of  the 35-39  group inherit. These figures 
can be  computed from table  5.3. 
Comment  Martin David 
Michael Wolfson should be complimented for a major breakthrough in 
understanding  the process of  intergenerational  wealth  transmission  and 
its  impact on  inequality  of  wealth.  His  approach  is  commendable  for 
working with distributions, for keeping the number of  parameters in his 
simulation to a minimum, and for exploring the sensitivity of  results with 
a number of extreme cases. 
Before embarking on a critique of  the specific simulation that Wolf- 
son has developed, it is useful to categorize the kinds of  information that 
can be obtained from simulation and to answer the question, What do 
we wish to know about the process of  transfer of  wealth between genera- 
tions? Five areas of  research appear to be relevant: 
( 1  ) the concentration and deconcentration of  wealth;  (2)  the share 
of  wealth held by the very rich that represents taxable capacity and the 
share of  wealth held by the poor that represents a resource which should 
be considered  in  transfer  payment  programs;  (3) the  transmission  of 
wealth  through  human  capital  investments;  (4)  the  transmission  of 
entrepreneurial  activity through family  enterprises; and  (5)  the main- 
tenance of  economic power  in  a  kinship  grouping  through  purposive 
creation of  family dynasties. 
Wolfson’s paper tells  us  about the first  two  areas  for  a  sample of 
Canadian families.  The technique  that  he  develops  appears useful for 
investigation of  at least some aspects of  the other three categories. 
There appears to be particularly little concern over  these five areas, 
in this conference. While intellectual curiosity may be satisfied by a view 
into the affairs of  the wealthy, support for serious study of  the wealth 
distribution  requires that we indicate clearly how knowledge  of  wealth 
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can increase the target efficiency of  government redistribution programs, 
and that we relate the consequences of  changes in the progression of  tax- 
ation on the wealthy to the level of  investment in human  and physical 
capital. 
I would like to organize my  remarks into two classes: those that can 
be handled within the limited framework describing the bequest process 
that has already been outlined; and those that require the addition of  one 
or more new routines in the simulation process, but which would appear 
to add greatly to the realism of  the results. 
Alterations of  the Model 
Savings Rates 
A major flaw in the work presented is  that we  have no data on the 
sensitivity  of  the  findings  to  the  savings  rates  assumed  for  the  age/ 
wealth/family  size groups. Table C5.1 reproduces the savings rates  on 
which  Wolfson  bases  the  accumulation  that occurs  in  the  simulation. 
These rates were extracted from the Statistics Canada FAMEX expendi- 
ture study for 1969. Several aspects of  the table are troublesome.  The 
savings are derived as a residual  from income and expenditure  reports 
in  the survey and are therefore  subject to the response errors that are 
well known  (and carefully  discussed by Ferber [1966] and Modigliani 
and Ando [1960]). The author also had available separate estimates of 
net change in assets and liabilities, and it would have been desirable to 
incorporate those estimates into alternative simulations. 
Table C5.1  Average Propensity to Save Out of  Disposable Income (%) 
Family Size I  1  Family Size 2 2  All FS 
Category  Poor  Middle  Rich  All W*  Poor  Middle  Rich  All W*  All W': 
<  25  0.0  1.8  8.5  2.7  1.9 
25-29  0.9  5.5  9.5  6.8  6.2 
30-34  6.3  4.4  6.7  17.5  6.2  6.2 
3  5-3  9  10.2  1.5  5.4  4.8  5.1 
40-44  5.3  2.5  6.6  14.0  6.3  6.3 
45-49  8.0  4.2  10.2  12.2  8.7  8.7 
50-54  5.6  13.8  8.6  7.1  9.9  12.6  9.5  9.4 
55-59  7.0  12.2  9.4  6.2  11.5  11.2  10.1  10.0 
60-64  .1  - .3  -  .1  8.2  9.8  9.9  9.4  8.2 
65-69  3.5  -3.5  -1.1  4.7  1.3  8.3  4.0  3  .O 
70-74  2.5  2.5  2.5  1.2  1.6  10.0  4.0  3.6 
2  75  -2.3  1.1  -1.6  4.3  -1.0  11.9  3.3  1.7 
All ages  3.0  .4  16.0  3.5  4.3  7.8  12.1  7.0  6.6 
Age 
Source:  Wolfson  (1977, p.  128). 
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A second problem with the table is  that from age 60 to age 70 there 
is a peculiar trough of  low savings or dissavings that disappears in most 
groups at age 75. I would guess that this  is  in part a phenomenon  of 
aggregation. As Shorrocks (1976) has pointed  out, the mortality risks 
tend to be less for persons with higher incomes. Thus cross-sectional age 
differences in  the table show differential selection  (within  each wealth 
class) of  those with higher earnings and higher savings rates. The differ- 
ence between savings rates of  those aged 65-69  and those aged 70-74 
is thus more likely to reflect differences in individuals and their income 
level than a shift in behavior. 
Both of  the foregoing problems might be attacked by using an explicit 
model of  the lifetime accumulation pattern  to generate  a savings func- 
tion that is smoothed across  age groups  and wealth groups.  The same 
model could then more explicitly deal with a richer family size classifica- 
tion. A second advantage of  the use of  a model on group mean average 
savings data is that it would overcome one of the difficulties that Wolf- 
son faced in deriving savings rates: the expenditure survey did not con- 
tain data on net worth. The table actually classifies families by  amount 
of  income from investment rather than by net wealth. With an identical 
matrix of  cells defined on the net worth survey, it would be possible to 
validate a wealth  effect from an aggregated  model. 
One strength of  the savings rate should be noted. The savings rate is 
net of  any gifts, so that inter vivos transfers to children are properly ex- 
cluded from the amounts accumulated into the estates of  decedents by 
the simulation. 
Number of Heirs 
A demographer would gasp at the manner in which Wolfson selects 
the number of  heirs. We have a choice of  1, 2, 4,  or 6 uniformly across 
the population. No rationale is offered for the choice of  these numbers, 
except in the case of  primogeniture.  It seems apparent that some effort 
should be made to tie the number of  heirs to the distribution of  eligible 
persons. Failing that, some effort should be made to relate the number 
of  heirs  and  their  age  to some likely  expectations  in  the  population. 
Fortunately, Menchik (1976) offers some evidence on the distribution of 
heirs by category of  relationship to the head (see table C5.2).  An average 
of  7.6 bequests are made in each estate (over $40,000) included in the 
sample. Roughly one-third are bequests to spouses, children, and grand- 
children.  Another  six  percent go  to brothers  or sisters.  Thus data  on 
completed family size are useful for distributing about four-tenths of  the 
total number of  bequests. U.S. data from Blau and Duncan  (1967) in- 
dicate that there would thus be approximately 2.45  children  per com- 
pleted family and therefore eligible to receive bequests from each of  the 
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Table C5.2  Proportion of  Beneficiaries by Relationship to Decedent 
Beneficiary’s 
Relationship to Decedent 
Spouse  43.1 
Child  126.0 
Grandchild  78.4 
Total  247.5 
Brother  20.0 
Sister  27.7 
Niece or nephew  135.5 
Total all beneficiaries  763.5 
Ratio of Number of  Beneficiaries 
to Number of  Estates ( X  100) 
Sozmx: Menchik  (1976, p.  144). 
Perhaps more interesting, and a useful factor to consider in simulat- 
ing the inequality of  wealth distribution, is that expected completed fam- 
ily size is inversely related to socioeconomic status  (see tables C5.3 and 
(3.4).  While Blau and Duncan point  out that the differential  fertility 
associated with  education  has  diminished  in  more  recent  cohorts,  the 
differentials shown for farm and nonfarm  residents are large and could 
be significant factors in changing the inequality of  wealth  distribution. 
Since Wolfson’s data include information on occupation, education, and 
place of  residence, it would be easy to vary the number of  heirs accord- 
ing to such variables and assess changes in the inequality of  the results. 
Primogeniture 
Wolfson  offers simulations in which  bequests  are concentrated on a 
single heir as one polar extreme. I find that possibility very unlikely, and 
would like to see some evidence that primogeniture  is still  a factor in 
the bequest process. (Menchik (1976) finds little evidence of  primogeni- 
ture in his Connecticut  probate  sample.)  The principal  motivation  for 
Table C5.3  Children Ever Born According to 
Husband’s Father’s Occupation 
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Table C5.4  Children Ever Born per Wife by Educational Attainment 
of  Wife and Farm Residence and Background of  Couple 
Nonfarm Residence 
Years of  School  Nonfarm  Farm  Farm 
Completed by Wife  Total  Background  Background  Residence 
Total 
Elementary 
0 to 4 
5 to 7 
8 
High  school 




4 or more 
2.45  2.2 1 
3.96  2.30 
3.07  2.39 
2.71  2.43 
2.47  2.38 
2.11  2.09 
2.14  1.99 

















Source: Blau and Duncan (1967, p. 382). 
primogeniture is the indivisibility of  assets involved in some closely held 
family enterprise, a farm or a business. Thus it might be of  use to sepa- 
rate the share of  wealth  that is in such enterprises and allocate it to a 
single heir, while dividing the remaining estate among several benefici- 
aries. Table (25.5 gives some indication  of  the importance of  a primo- 
Table C5.5  Mean Net Worth and Equity in Business within 1969 Income 
Class (all households, Canada, 1969) 
1969 Income  Average Net Worth  Median 
Group (lower  Percent  Equity in  Ratio: 
bound of  inter-  Excluding  Including  with  Business  Bus. Equity 
val in $000~)  Business  Business  Equity in  (holders  to Total 
Equity  Equity  Business  only)  Net Worth 
-m  4.0  7.4  13.5 
+1  6.9  8.9  7.2 
2  8.4  11.1  15.6 
3  10.2  12.8  17.2 
4  10.2  13.6  16.6 
5  9.6  11.3  11.2 
6  10.8  12.8  13.5 
7  12.7  14.8  11.1 
10  18.1  20.8  13.2 
15  33.9  39.4  21.6 
25  94.8  205.2  53.4 
Total  14.4  18.4  14.0 
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geniture relating only to business  assets. For Canada as a whole  about 
one-fifth  of  net wealth  is  in business  equity  (proprietorships,  partner- 
ships, or closely held corporations). The percent is particularly high in 
the top income group and the lowest income group, suggesting that the 
proposed modification  of  the rule could lead to substantial differences 
from the bounding simulations that Wolfson shows in table 5.1. 
One last  suggested alteration  of  Wolfson’s model  is  that  wealth  be 
divided between the surviving spouse and children at the time of  death 
of  the first marriage partner. As far as I can see, this would be possible 
within  the framework  that Wolfson  has  already  derived.  Table  (25.6 
delineates  the  nature  of  Wolfson’s assumption  that  assets  pass  exclu- 
sively to the surviving spouse. The options marked w can be simulated 
within  Wolfson’s assumptions,  depending  upon  the  age  difference  as- 
sumed between  decedent  and beneficiary. The asterisks  indicate  addi- 
tional possibilities for splitting the estate, possibilities which may do noth- 
ing to lessen the inequality of  wealth among family dynasties, but which 
may go a great length to lessening the degree of  inequality in  the dis- 
tribution  of  wealth  among households  (see Menchik  1976, chap.  4). 
These additional possibilities are important in several ways. Table C5.7 
addresses the question of  how  much  present  value  is  left  to  children 
when the spouse is provided for by a generation skipping trust through 
which the spouse has  a lifetime  interest while  the children have  a  re- 
mainder interest. The table shows, given the distribution of  age at death, 
that the  trust  mechanism  passes  a  healthy  percent  of  the  decedent’s 
wealth  to  the  children.  Considering  the  infrequency  with  which  the 
principal of  trusts is invaded, the value of  the conditional wealth  repre- 
sented by the present value of  the remainder interest ought to be counted 
part of  the wealth  of  the  children  rather  than  wealth  of  the surviving 
spouse. This would generally produce an equalizing change in the simula- 
tion outcomes. 
Table  (25.8,  taken  from  Menchik’s  sample  of  Connecticut  probate 
records, indicates the proportion of  the estate going to spouse, children, 
and grandchildren by wealth  class of  the estate.  (The values passed to 
Table C5.6  Alternative Beneficiaries for the Estate 
Decedent 
Ever 
Case  Married? 
A  No 




Children  Eligible Heirs 
Surviving  Ever 
Spouse?  Born?  Spouse  Children  Grandchildren  Others 
W 
Yes  No  W  * 
Yes  W  a  *(possibly)  * 
No  No  W 
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children and grandchildren are present values of  remainder interests, such 
as those contained in table (25.7 when the bequest is in trust.)  Confirma- 
tion of  this pattern was reported by Jantscher  (1967), who shows that 
trusts  involving spouse-children, and  children-grandchildren  as  income 
and remaindermen account for a large share of  the total wealth passing 
Table C5.7  Present Value of  a Remainder Interest in 
an Estate Left to the Children, with a 
Life Interest to the Surviving Spouse 
Age at Death of Spouse 
25  45  65  75 
Widower 
Life expectancy  45.6  27.4  13.0  8.1 
Present value of  the 
principal interest 
discounted at 
5%  .lo8  ,267  .530  .674 
7%  .046  .157  .415  .578 
Widow 
Life expectancy  51.8  32.9  16.3  9.6 
Present value of  the 
principal interest 
discounted at 
5%  ,079  .201  .452  .626 
7 70  .030  .lo8  .332  .522 
Table C5.8  Mean Bequest and Share of  Bequest to Beneficiaries within 
Wealth Class (Connecticut probate sample) 
Wealth Class 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
Mean bequest ($000) 


















77.8  138.9  278.5 
.24  .20  .23 
.34  .35  .27 
.04  .04  .05 
.62  .59  .55 
.06  .04  .03 
.05  .04  .05 
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into trusts at death  (see tables C5.9 and C5.10). Both Menchik’s and 
Jantscher’s studies show that the number of heirs increases with increas- 
ing  estate size, and that there is  an increased  tendency  to generation 
skipping (which Menchik demonstrates to be tax induced). While these 
findings, peculiar to  U.S. institutions  in  transfer  taxation, may  not be 
directly applicable to the Canadian  tax environment, they  suggest that 
several extensions of  the model  are highly desirable:  variable  numbers 
of  heirs should be generated by a distribution  of  completed family size; 
estates should be divided  among persons from several generations; the 
number of  generations involved in a single transfer should be made con- 
ditional on the size of  the estate. Each extension appears to be a desir- 
Table C5.9  Bequests in Spouse-Children and Children-Grandchildren Trusts 
and Value of  Such Bequests, as a Percentage of  Total Bequests, 
All Decedents, 1957 and 1959, by Size of  Estate 
Estate Size 
Trust Type  Small  Medium  Large 
Spouse-children 
All decedents bequeathing property  5.2  10.4  9.0 
Trust-creating decedents bequeathing property  34.6  26.8  16.1 
Total value of  bequests in trust  35.0  24.7  11.2 
Children-grandchildren 
All decedents bequeathing property  2.0  6.2  13.4 
Trust-creating decedents bequeathing property  13.1  16.0  24.2 
Total value of  bequests in trust  13.4  16.1  25.8 
Source: Jantscher (1967, p. 68). 
Table C5.10  Bequests in Spouse-Children and Children-Grandchildren Trusts 
and Value of  Such Bequests, as a Percentage of Total Bequests, 
Husbands, 1957 and 1959, by Size of  Estate 
Estate Size 
Trust Type  Small  Medium  Large 
Spouse-children 
All husbands bequeathing property  9.8  19.8  17.4 
Trust-creating husbands bequeathing property  53.8  44.2  29.4 
Total value of  bequests in trust  52.9  41.8  22.0 
All husbands bequeathing property  0.5  3.4  11.0 
Children-grandchildren 
Trust-creating husbands bequeathing property  2.6  7.7  18.5 
Total value of  bequests in trust  1.3  6.4  16.9 
Source: Jantscher  (1967, p.  71). 219  The Bequest Process and the Causes of  Inequality 
able and more realistic specification of  the bequest process than what can 
be captured in the bounding simulations involving award of  bequests to 
a single age difference in relation to the decedent and a uniform number 
of  heirs within  each of  two wealth classes. 
Finally, no simulation is complete without an accounting of  the trans- 
mission of  human capital. Inclusion of  an algorithm for intergenerational 
transmission of  education would be extremely valuable, as it is  the joint 
distribution of  human and nonhuman capital that is of  the greatest policy 
significance. 
Further Comment  Michael C. Wolfson 
Professor David, in his comment, has indicated a number of  useful points 
and directions for further work. Let me first reply to some of  his specific 
criticisms. He suggests that a major flaw in my paper is the absence of a 
sensitivity  analysis with respect to the saving rates used in  the simula- 
tions. In fact, in my thesis on which this paper is based  (Wolfson 1977), 
a fairly extensive sensitivity analysis was performed. The results showed, 
for example, that assuming a uniform 10 percent saving rate for all age/ 
wealth/family  size groups made almost no difference to the simulation 
results. 
Considerations  of  space did not permit any explanation in the paper 
of  the saving process actually used in the model. It is the case, however, 
that the saving rates displayed in Professor David’s table C5.1 comprise 
only one part of  the saving function. The general saving function used 
in the model is given by the following equation (all items disaggregated 
by  the  two family  size  categories;  time  subscript  omitted  for  conve- 
nience). 
-  (1 +  sairai)zIdz 
where a =  age group 
i =  wealth class 
Vi =  lower limit of  ith wealth class 
W,,(x)  =  wealth density before saving 
Wa+,(x)  =wealth  density after saving 
sai  =  saving rate out of  income 
rai  =  yield on wealth after tax 
S:i  (y)  =  probability distribution for saving out of  earnings 220  Michael C. Wolfson 
The saving rates  in  Professor  David’s table C5.1 refer only to the s,i, 
though his comments about the definition of  saving apply equally to the 
derivation of  the sai and the Sz(y). 
A second concern raised by Professor David is the definition of sav- 
ing. The difference between  the definition  actually used  and net change 
in  assets and liabilities less net capital receipts  (gifts received less gifts 
given), an alternative suggested by Professor David, is indicated by the 
following sum: payments for insurance,  annuities, and private  and reg- 
istered pension plans +  net accumulation of  motor vehicles -  one-half 
of  pension and private annuity income. These items were included in our 
definition of  saving first to eliminate the difference in  the definition  of 
wealth between the SCF( 1973) and the FAMEX (1973) in the case of 
motor vehicles, and second to capture pension saving and dis-saving. 
With regard  to the patterns  shown by  the saving rates  in  Professor 
David’s table (3.1,  it is  not  clear that Professor  David’s concerns are 
entirely  appropriate.  His  point  about mortality  selection  is  obviously 
relevant. However, it is  not necessarily  a correct interpretation  of  the 
table to infer a peculiar trough in savings in the 60 to 70 age range. For 
all wealth groups combined,  there is  a fairly clear pattern  of  declining 
but always positive saving rates from age 55 on. There is  greater  vari- 
ability  within  the  columns  associated  with  specific family  size/wealth 
categories.  However,  this  could  be  the  result  of  movement  of  family 
units from family size group 2 to size group 1 as they age as a result of 
mortality, or from movement from higher to lower wealth classes, both 
of  which actually occurred  (see Wolfson  1977, p. 124). 
In my paper, I used quite arbitrary choices for the number of heirs in 
the simulations, as Professor David has pointed out. The Menchik data 
he cites are certainly interesting in this regard, though I was unaware of 
them when the simulations were  being  run.  In any case, the range  of 
simulations  actually  run  gives  results  that  are  clear  enough,  and  the 
range chosen is not unreasonable  given the figures presented  in Profes- 
sor David’s table C5.2. 
Finally, Professor David has indicated a number of  directions in which 
the model could be extended. Of  course, in any exercise like that of my 
thesis,  a  number  of  choices  must be made  regarding  the  areas  where 
more or less  detailed  effort  should  be  applied-everything  cannot  be 
done at once. It is  hoped that some of  the extensions to the model that 
he has suggested can be incorporated sometime in  the future. 221  The Bequest Process and the Causes of  Inequality 
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